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Do liquidity shocks matter? While even a simple `yes' or `no' presents identification challenges, going
beyond this entails tracing how such shocks to lenders are passed on to borrowers, and whether borrowers
can in turn cushion these shocks through the credit market. This paper does so by using data that follows
all loans made by lenders to borrowing firms in Pakistan, and exploiting cross-bank variation in liquidity
shocks induced by the unanticipated nuclear tests in 1998. We isolate the causal impact of the bank
lending channel by showing that for the same firm borrowing from two different banks, its loan from
the bank experiencing a 1% larger decline in liquidity drops by an additional 0.6%. The liquidity shock
also lowers the probability of continued lending to old clients and extending credit to new ones. Although
this lending channel affects all firms significantly, large firms and those with strong business and political
ties completely compensate the effect by borrowing more from more liquid banks - both through existing
and new banking relationships. In contrast, small unconnected firms are entirely unable to hedge and
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asim_ijaz_khwaja@harvard.eduBanks around the world, particularly in emerging markets, often face large shocks to their
supply of liquidity.1 These shocks may be driven by changes in monetary policy, speculative
bank runs, ￿hot money￿￿ ows, or exchange rate volatility. Many observers argue that banks
pass on these ￿ uctuations to borrowing ￿rms even when there is no change in the ￿rms￿overall
credit worthiness. Such ￿nancial shocks can have large real e⁄ects if ￿rms that receive banking
shocks are unable to smooth them.2
Investigating banks as a conduit for transmitting ￿nancial shocks thus requires estimating
both the bank lending channel - the inability of banks to cushion borrowing ￿rms against shocks
to the banks￿liquidity supply, and the ￿rm borrowing channel - the inability of ￿rms to smooth
out bank-lending channel e⁄ects by borrowing from alternative sources of ￿nancing.
Existing work provides increasing evidence on the ￿rst channel (Kashyap et. al., 1993; Peek
and Rosengren, 1997; Kashyap and Stein 2000; Paravisini, 2006). Related studies also consider
the impact of liquidity shocks on economic outcomes and ￿nd signi￿cant real e⁄ects of the
supply shocks arguing they may be to blame for economic recessions (Bernanke 1983; Peek and
Rosengren, 2000). Yet others ￿nd liquidity shock impacts to be insigni￿cant (Ashcraft, 2006)
or varying by ￿rm type (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Kashyap, Lamont and Stein 1994). This
suggests that the ￿rm borrowing channel may be the critical factor in determining whether and
how the bank lending channel gets transmitted to the economy. However, investigating this has
proven di¢ cult.
The di¢ culty in simultaneously estimating the bank lending and ￿rm borrowing channels
stems from identi￿cation concerns as well as the unavailability of micro-level data linking banks
to ￿rms. Identi￿cation concerns arise because events that trigger changes in liquidity supply,
such as monetary policy innovations or deposit shocks are often accompanied by changes in
investment returns and consequently, credit demand. Changes in ￿rm borrowing therefore
re￿ ect both changes in credit supply as well as credit demand. This paper proposes a new
empirical methodology for identifying the bank lending channel and uses a loan-level panel
data set to estimate bank lending and ￿rm borrowing channels simultaneously.
A simple example illustrates our methodology for identifying the bank lending channel, and
1For example, the average standard deviation of the real cost of deposits is 1.6% in G7 countries but 12.9%
in 25 major emerging markets, and the standard deviation of real demand deposit growth is 14% and 24%
respectively (IMF International Financial Statistics, 1980-2005).
2For example, work such as Fisher (1933), Bernanke (1983), Calomiris and Mason (2003) attribute the great
depression to such banking crises.
2estimating the ￿rm borrowing channel. Consider two banks in an economy, one of which (bank
A) experiences a negative liquidity supply shock while the other (bank B) experiences no change.
Bank A might restrict its lending after the negative shock, but that cannot be fully attributed
to the bank lending channel since ￿rms borrowing from bank A might simultaneously have
received a negative liquidity demand shock. Such positive correlation between supply shocks
to banks and demand shocks to ￿rms is the main identi￿cation problem in the literature.
Our solution to this problem comes from focusing on ￿rms that borrowed from both banks
A and B at the time of the shock, and then comparing how loans to the same ￿rm from
bank A change relative to loans from bank B. This within ￿rm di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences strategy
translates into putting ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects after ￿rst-di⁄erencing the loan level data. Since ￿rm
￿xed e⁄ects absorb the entire ￿rm speci￿c change in credit demand, the estimated di⁄erence
in loan changes within the same ￿rm can be plausibly attributed to di⁄erences in bank level
liquidity shocks, i.e. the bank lending channel.3
Identifying the bank lending channel is not su¢ cient though since its ultimate impact on
￿rms also depends on the ￿rm borrowing channel. In our example above, if the a⁄ected ￿rms
can borrow more from other banks, such as bank B or a third bank C, then the lending channel
will have no real impact on the economy. Tracing such borrowing channels requires that one
observe a ￿rm￿ s borrowing from each bank separately over time. We could then test whether
￿rms that initially borrowed from bank A were able to compensate from other banks or not.
The methodology described above requires unanticipated liquidity shocks to the banking
sector that vary across banks, and loan level data that links ￿rms to each lender before and after
shocks. We implement this methodology using a natural experiment induced by the unexpected
nuclear tests in Pakistan in 1998 along with a quarterly loan-level panel data (1996-2000) that
represents the universe of corporate lending in the country (18,000 ￿rms).
When Pakistan announced testing of its nuclear weapons a fortnight after similar tests by
India in 1998, the government - in anticipation of the balance of payment problems - forced banks
with dollar-denominated deposit accounts to withhold payments in dollars. These banks could
only pay back their dollar deposit holders in local currency at an unfavorable exchange rate.
Such partial defaults triggered large withdrawals of deposits from banks with dollar deposits.
Since banks di⁄ered signi￿cantly in what fraction of their deposits were in dollar-denominated
3Section IV.D. discusses some remaining identi￿cation concerns in detail.
3accounts, nuclear tests generated signi￿cant cross-bank variation in shocks to their deposit base.
Using the loan-level data set, we ￿rst focus on ￿rms borrowing from multiple banks at
the time of the nuclear tests and use the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects methodology to identify the bank
lending channel. Our within ￿rm comparison reveals that a percentage point larger decline in
bank liquidity supply leads to 0.6% reduction in loan amount by the bank. There is also a
large lending channel e⁄ect on the extensive margin: a 1% fall in bank liquidity reduces the
probability of lending to new clients by 12 basis points and the probability of continuing lending
to existing clients by 21 basis points. The bank lending channel works through its impact on
quantity as we ￿nd no evidence of change in price of loans due to bank liquidity shocks.
The ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects approach provides an unbiased estimate of the lending channel since
the shocks are unanticipated and one need not rely on the potentially contentious assumption
that bank level credit supply shocks are uncorrelated with ￿rm level credit demand shocks.
The downside of this approach is that it restricts analysis to ￿rms with multiple banking
relationships. However, by comparing our unbiased ￿xed e⁄ect estimate with its biased OLS
counterpart, we can prove empirically that nuclear tests induced a negative correlation between
credit supply and credit demand shocks. The negative correlation makes the OLS estimate a
conservative measure of the bank lending channel e⁄ect. We can thus expand our analysis to
the full sample, and doing so shows that lending channel is present for all types of ￿rms.
The estimated negative cross-sectional correlation between liquidity supply and demand
shocks is plausible because, as we show later, banks that received larger negative shocks to
their liquidity supply (i.e. banks with more dollar deposits) were better banks lending to better
￿rms. If these ￿rms were better able to cope with the changing macro environment, then their
credit demand shocks will be less adverse relative to ￿rms at other (una⁄ected) banks.
We next estimate ￿rm borrowing channel. Large ￿rms (i.e. top 30% of ￿rms by size) are
able to undo the entire bank lending channel shock by borrowing more from more liquid banks.
Similarly, ￿connectedness￿helps ￿rms to compensate the bank lending channel shocks. Firm
connectedness is proxied by whether the ￿rm is part of large business networks or whether it has
a politician in its board of directors. Smaller unconnected ￿rms on the other hand are unable
to hedge the bank lending channel and face large overall borrowing drops. Splitting the ￿rm
borrowing channel between existing and new relationship banks, we ￿nd that large borrowers
equally compensate their lending channel loan loss by borrowing from (relatively) more liquid
4banks with whom they had pre-existing relationships and from new relationship banks.
The inability of small and unconnected ￿rms to undo the negative e⁄ects of lending channel
shocks a⁄ects their ￿nancial outcomes as well. For example, within small ￿rms, a ￿rm that
borrows from a bank with a one percent larger decline in liquidity, is 2% more likely to enter
into ￿nancial distress a year after the nuclear tests. On the other hand there is no such e⁄ect
within large ￿rms, consistent with the ￿nding that large ￿rms can hedge lending channel shocks.
While theoretical work, such as Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Stein (1998), emphasizes that transmission of ￿nancial shocks
to the real economy requires credit market imperfections at both the bank and ￿rm level,
empirical literature has mostly focused on the banking side. Our paper di⁄ers in simultaneously
testing for market frictions at the bank and ￿rm level.
Literature on the bank lending channel started with papers such as Bernanke and Blinder
(1992), Bernanke (1983), and Bernanke and James (1991), that used time-series correlations
between changes in liquidity and changes in loans (or output) to argue that liquidity shocks
have real consequences. The concern that these time series correlations may be confounded
by economy wide productivity shocks then led to work such as Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ashcraft (2006) that use
cross-sectional variation in liquidity supply across banks or ￿rms to purge out economy levels
shocks. Others use instrumental variables (Paravisini; 2006) or look for natural experiments
(Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Ashcraft, 2005) that generate exogenous (to demand) liquid-
ity supply shocks. In contrast, our methodology need not make any identifying assumptions
about liquidity supply and demand shocks correlation. Instead, by using ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects, we
purge out all ￿rm-speci￿c credit demand changes in order to isolate the bank lending channel.
The ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects strategy also allows us to sign the liquidity supply and demand shocks
correlation and show that OLS provides conservative estimates. Since loan-level data sets of
the type used in our paper are becoming increasingly available, our strategy is generalizable to
other environments for identi￿cation and understanding the bias in OLS estimates.
Our results highlight the usefulness of simultaneously estimating ￿rm borrowing channel.
While we ￿nd that the bank lending channel is large and present for all types of ￿rms, an
important subset of ￿rms are able to undo the ￿nancial impact of bank lending channel. The
inability of small and unconnected ￿rms to substitute away the bank lending channel shocks
5means that ￿nancial shocks can have signi￿cant distributional consequences.
In what follows, section I describes the data and the institutional background. Section II
presents our empirical methodology. Sections III, IV and V provide results concerning the
bank lending and ￿rm borrowing channels, and whether these channels have any impact on
￿rm ￿nancial distress. Section VI concludes.
I Institutional Background and Data
A. The 1998 Liquidity Crunch
Unanticipated nuclear tests by India on 11th May 1998 led to retaliatory nuclear tests by
Pakistan on the 28th of May. These events led to a large and sudden liquidity shock for banks
in Pakistan. The extent of this shock varied across banks depending on their exposure to dollar
denominated deposit accounts. We outline the sequence of events that led to these changes.
Dollar Deposit Accounts
By the early 1990s Pakistan had a relatively liberalized banking sector with signi￿cant
private and foreign bank participation. Banking reforms during this period included the in-
troduction of foreign currency (mostly dollar) deposit accounts in Pakistan. The scheme was
aimed at stopping the ￿ ight of dollars oversees by allowing citizens to hold foreign currency
within Pakistan.
An important feature of the dollar accounts was that local banks accepting dollar deposits
could not retain dollars. Banks had to surrender dollars to the central bank, the State Bank
of Pakistan (SBP), in return for rupees at the prevalent exchange rate. When a depositor
demanded his dollars (with interest) back, the bank obtained dollars from the central bank in
exchange for rupees at the initial (i.e. time of deposit) exchange rate. Therefore all exchange
rate risk between the time of deposit and the time of withdrawal was borne by the central
bank (see SBP noti￿cation #54, June 7, 1992) and the SBP charged banks a 3% annual fee for
providing this insurance. Given currency devaluation trends, these dollar deposit accounts were
widely popular and by May 1998, in a span of six years, dollar deposits had grown to 43:5% of
total deposits in Pakistan.
However, the exposure to dollar deposits was not uniform across banks. As of December
1997 the percentage of a bank￿ s deposits denominated in dollars varied from 0% to 98%, with a
6standard deviation of 27%. This cross-bank variation was clearly not exogenous and depended
on a host of factors such as the customer base of a bank, its marketing strategy, and its perceived
outlook. In particular, as we show in section (II), better and more pro￿table banks held a higher
percentage of dollar deposits:
￿Freeze￿on Dollar Deposit Accounts
When India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in May 1998, the international community
moved swiftly to impose sanctions on both countries. The sanctions were limited to military
sales and ￿nancial assistance, and did not involve any major trade sanctions. However, suspen-
sion of exchange rate liquidity support from the IMF led to balance of payment problems for
Pakistan.
Anticipating these problems, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, along with the announcement
of the nuclear tests on May 28th, declared that all foreign currency accounts would be ￿partially
frozen￿ . This meant that dollar deposit holders could only withdraw money in rupees at the
current and disadvantaged exchange rate. The freeze thus amounted to a partial default on
dollar deposits by the government, with depositors losing 10-15% of their deposit value.
The loss of con￿dence as a result of this partial default turned out to have a serious impact
on the banking sector. Dollar deposit holders withdrew their money from banks despite only
being able to do so at disadvantaged exchange rates. Figure I traces the aggregate dollar
deposits over time and shows the sudden and precipitous withdrawal from dollar accounts after
the nuclear tests with these deposits falling by a half within a year of the freeze.
Part of this liquidity exited the Pakistani banking system, as it was converted back into
dollars through the black market and invested abroad. Since the deposit run was experienced
by banks with larger dollar deposit accounts, the liquidity shock varied substantially across
banks, with several rupee deposit reliant banks continuing to enjoy pre-nuclear test deposit
growth.
The nuclear tests thus lead to sharp cross-sectional variation in deposit-led liquidity shocks
experienced by banks. Figure II illustrates this variation for all the forty two commercial banks
that issued demandable deposits in local and foreign currency. It plots the average annual
change in liquidity for these banks from December 1997 to December 1999 against their pre-
nuclear test reliance on dollar deposits. Each observation is plotted proportional to bank size
in December 1997. The graph shows a strong negative relationship between dollar deposit
7exposure and changes in bank liquidity.4 We exploit this feature in our estimation strategy in
section II.
While the nuclear induced liquidity shocks are somewhat unique in their origin and lack
of anticipation, the magnitude of these shocks is fairly representative of liquidity shocks expe-
rienced by Pakistan and other emerging markets historically. While the 1998 events reduced
the growth in deposits from 17% to 5%, the Pakistani economy experienced such low deposit
growth on at least 4 separate occasions in the prior two decades. The high volatility of the
banking sector in Pakistan is also very representative of other emerging markets. The stan-
dard deviation of real annual growth rates of demand deposits was 15.8% (1.65 times the mean
growth rate) in Pakistan during 1980-2005 compared to 24% (2.1 times the mean growth rate)
for 26 major emerging markets.5 In fact such variability is also present in developed economies,
with G7 countries experiencing a standard deviation of demand deposit growth of 13.7% during
the same time period.
The banking sector in Pakistan is also liberal and representative of emerging markets. Pri-
vate, foreign and government banks constitute roughly equal shares of domestic lending. Finan-
cial reforms in the early 90s brought uniform prudential regulations in-line with international
banking practices (Basel accord) and autonomy was granted to the State Bank of Pakistan
(SBP) for regulation. While political e⁄orts have been made in the past to bring banking in
accordance with Islamic shariah laws, it has not had any signi￿cant functional impact on bank-
ing. For all practical purposes banking follows global norms with deposit and lending rates
determined by the market.
B. Data
Our primary data comes from the credit information bureau (CIB) of SBP. The central bank
maintains this data to monitor and regulate the lending activities of banks. It has quarterly
loan-level information on the universe of corporate bank loans outstanding in Pakistan between
July 1996 and March 2000. The data includes the history of each loan with information on the
amount and type of loan outstanding, default amounts and duration. It also has information
on the name, location and board of directors of the borrowing ￿rm and its bank. We combine
4Changes in deposits refer to book values and hence are not too much in￿ uenced by current price ￿ uctuations.
5The numbers are based on International Financial Statistics (IFS) data and 26 major emerging markets
included in the Morgan Stanley global equity index (MSCI).
8this data with annual balance sheet information on banks.
In terms of data quality, our personal examination of the collection and compilation pro-
cedures, as well as consistency checks on the data suggest that it is of high quality. CIB was
part of a large e⁄ort by the central bank to setup a reliable information sharing resource that
all banks could access. Perhaps the most credible signal of data quality is the fact that all
local and foreign banks refer to information in CIB on a daily basis to verify the credit history
of prospective borrowers. We checked with one of the private banks in Pakistan and found
that they use CIB information about prospective borrowers explicitly in their internal credit
scoring models. We also ran several internal consistency tests on the data such as aggregation
checks, and found the data to be of excellent quality. As a random check, we also con￿rmed the
authenticity of the data from a bank branch by comparing it to the portfolio of that branch￿ s
loan o¢ cer.
Although the original data includes 145 ￿nancial intermediaries, for most of our analysis
we will restrict our sample to the 42 commercial banks that were allowed to open demandable
deposits (including dollar deposits). The remaining ￿nancial intermediaries had private or
institutional sources of funding and are excluded because we do not have information on their
changes in liquidity. The sample restriction however should not be a big concern for two reasons.
First, the excluded ￿nancial intermediaries only make up 22% of overall lending at the time of
nuclear tests. Second, since the excluded institutions were not taking dollar or rupee deposits,
they were unlikely to have been signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the nuclear tests. Therefore including
them in our sample makes no qualitative di⁄erence to the results of this paper. However,
we do include lending by all these ￿nancial intermediaries when we examine aggregate ￿rm
outcomes such as overall ￿rm borrowing and default rates, since these intermediaries could play
an important role in hedging ￿rms against the bank-lending channel shocks.
We use the above data to analyze the impact of the liquidity crunch resulting from the
nuclear tests of May 1998. Our starting point is the set of all performing private business loans
given out by the 42 commercial banks at the time of nuclear tests. This gives us a sample of
22,176 loans to 18,647 ￿rms. A ￿loan￿in our paper is de￿ned as a bank-￿rm pair. There are
more loans than ￿rms since a single ￿rm may borrow from multiple banks. Although we have
quarterly data on the 22,176 loans from July 1996 to March 2000, for most of the analysis we
collapse our quarterly time dimension into equal duration single ￿pre￿and ￿post￿nuclear test
9periods by taking time-series averages of loans.6 This time-collapsing of data has the advantage
that our standard errors are robust to concerns of auto-correlation (see Bertrand, Du￿ o and
Mullainathan, 2004).
Table I presents summary statistics for the loan, ￿rm and bank level variables in our primary
data set. Since our data covers the universe of all business loans, there is large variation in
loan sizes. For example, the average loan size is about 16 million rupees, median is 2.5 million
rupees, and the 99th percentile loan is 230 million rupees. Given the large size variation, we
checked both size-weighted and un-weighted results to ensure that our conclusions are neither
entirely driven by the large number of very small loans, nor a small number of very large loans.
The table also presents loan distribution across ￿rms by di⁄erent ￿rm attributes such as size,
political connections, membership in business conglomerates and others. A ￿rm is considered
politically connected if one of its directors is a politician. It is considered to be a ￿conglomerate￿
￿rm if it is a member of a large network of ￿rms that are linked through common directors i.e.
inter-locked boards. These attributes are explained in detail in the appendix.
In some of the empirical speci￿cations run, we expand the sample in Table I to include new
￿rms ￿nanced by commercial banks after nuclear tests (18,299 loans), as well as loans given
out by the 103 non-commercial banks.
II Empirical Methodology
This section outlines a simple econometric model that highlights the traditional identi￿cation
problem in the lending channel literature and how our ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects approach addresses it.
We then describe how we use our approach to go beyond the bank lending channel and estimate
the extent to which ￿rms are able to compensate their lending channel shocks:
A. Estimating the Bank Lending Channel: The traditional identi￿cation
problem
Consider a two period model with bank i providing ￿nancing to ￿rm j each period. For
simplicity, assume that a bank can only lend to one ￿rm while ￿rms can borrow from multiple
6The time-series averages are taken after converting all values to real 1995 rupees. Moreover, we exclude the
quarter of the nuclear tests from these calculations. The pre-shock period covers July 1996 through March 1998
while post-shock period covers July 1998 through March 2000.
10banks.7 In the ￿rst period t; a bank and ￿rm negotiate a loan of size Lt
ij: The bank ￿nances this
loan by issuing demandable deposits Dt
i; and seeking alternative ￿nancing Bt
i (such as equity,
bonds etc.): Since Lt





Models of the lending channel such as Stein (1998) are based on costly external ￿nancing.
We incorporate this feature by assuming that banks can raise deposits costlessly but only up
to D
t
i: Beyond this limit, it is costly to raise additional ￿nancing (Bt
i) with the marginal cost
given by (￿B ￿ Bt
i) where ￿B > 0: The overall bank credit supply function (Dt
i + Bt
i) is thus
linear in the cost of funds.
On the credit demand side, we assume that the marginal return loan Lt
ij is decreasing in
size and given by (rj ￿￿LLt
ij): The equilibrium amounts of Bt
i and Lt
ij are thus determined by
the intersection of linear supply and demand curves in each period.
At the end of ￿rst period t, the economy (i.e. banks and ￿rms) receives two types of
shocks. The ￿rst, a ￿credit supply￿shock, determines the level of deposits available to each





i + ￿ + ￿i , where ￿ and ￿i are economy wide and bank-speci￿c shocks respectively.
The second shock is a ￿credit demand￿shock that ￿rm j experiences in the form of a shock to
its productivity. In particular, the marginal return on its loan Lt+1
ij next period is now given
by: rj ￿ ￿LLt+1
ij + ￿ + ￿j: The productivity shock (￿ + ￿j) re￿ ects an economy wide and a
￿rm-speci￿c component respectively.
Given the linear set up of our model, equilibrium each period is determined by jointly solving
the FOC 8 and accounting identity (1) for Lij and Bi. Solutions for the two periods (assuming




(￿ + ￿i) +
1
(￿L + ￿B)
(￿ + ￿j) (2)
Equation (2), although derived from an admittedly simple model, highlights some important
issues. First, it shows the importance of costly external ￿nancing: Without this assumption
7We want to emphasize here that our purpose is not to build a fully speci￿ed model of bank intermediation.
We shall deliberately only focus on those features that highlight the fundamental econometric issues.
8The FOC is ￿BB
t
i = r ￿ ￿LL
t
ij in period t; and ￿BB
t+1
i = r + ￿ + ￿j ￿ ￿LL
t+1
ij in period t + 1:
11(i.e. with ￿B = 0), banks would be in a Modigliani-Miller world and shocks to deposits or
￿liquidity shock￿(￿) would have no impact on equilibrium loan amounts. Second, and more
importantly, equation (2) highlights the identi￿cation problem in estimating the causal impact











The ￿rst term on the RHS of (3) is just a constant re￿ ecting economy wide shocks. Thus
￿rst-di⁄erencing takes out all secular time trends in the economy through the constant term.
Let ￿0 (= 1
(￿L+￿B)[￿B ￿￿+￿]) denote this constant. The second term on the RHS contains the
main coe¢ cient of interest. Let ￿1 = ￿B
(￿L+￿B); then ￿1 captures the ￿lending channel￿for each
incremental unit of deposits lost. The OLS regression typically run to estimate (3) is:
￿Lij = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ ￿Di + ￿j + "ij (4)




1 in (4) will be biased if Corr(￿Di;￿j) 6= 0: This isolates the fundamental problem: In
general ￿Di and ￿j are likely to be positively correlated. For example, liquidity shocks (￿Di)
such as bank runs are more likely to occur in banks that receive some bad news (￿j) about the
quality or productivity of the ￿rms they lend to.
B. An Unbiased Estimate of the Lending Channel: Firm Fixed E⁄ects







V ar(￿i) : We adopt a new method for identifying the lending
channel ￿1 by introducing ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects ￿j in (4):
￿Lij = ￿j + ￿1 ￿ ￿Di + "ij (5)
Since the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿j are introduced after ￿rst-di⁄erencing the data, they absorb all ￿rm-
speci￿c credit demand shocks ￿j: The FE approach thus tests whether the same ￿rm borrowing
from two di⁄erent banks experiences a larger decline in lending from the bank that faces a
relatively greater fall in it￿ s liquidity supply. Since the comparison is done across banks for the
12same ￿rm, all ￿rm speci￿c demand shocks are absorbed by the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect.9 However, we




1 in the sample of ￿rms that have multiple-
banking relationships.
While the ￿xed e⁄ects strategy does not require or make any assumptions about the cor-
relation between liquidity supply and demand shocks (since the latter is absorbed by the ￿rm
￿xed e⁄ect) one would prefer that the liquidity supply shock be unanticipated. This is the
case in the natural experiment examined in this paper. The concern is that if such shocks are
anticipated, banks may adjust their lending or ￿rms adjust their borrowing prior to the shock.
This would lead to either an under or overestimate of the bank lending channel depending on
the direction of the pre-shock loan adjustments. Unanticipated shocks remove such concerns
since no pre-shock adjustments are made.
Although ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects address the main identi￿cation concerns expressed in the litera-
ture, there may remain some additional questions. For example, perhaps a ￿rm￿ s loan demand
is bank speci￿c and is correlated with shocks to the bank￿ s liquidity. For example, this can
happen if, (i) nuclear shocks disproportionately e⁄ect export demand, (ii) ￿rms get ￿export
related￿loans from banks that specialize in exports, and (iii) these export intensive banks had
more dollar deposits and thus su⁄ered a larger liquidity crunch as well. We shall address this
and other related concerns in detail in section IV D.
C. Estimating the Firm Borrowing Channel
We also utilize the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects estimates of the bank lending channel to provide conser-
vative estimates of the ￿rm borrowing channel. The latter channel examines whether ￿rms
can negate the e⁄ects of adverse lending channel shocks from existing banks by borrowing from
more liquid banks. Furthermore, if they are unable to do so, can they draw on internal/informal
resources or will they instead enter ￿nancial distress?
Let Y t
j be a ￿rm level attribute of interest in period t (such as a ￿rm￿ s total borrowing from
all banks or it￿ s average default rate on these loans). Then the reduced form ￿rm borrowing
9This argument is slightly more subtle. Once we recognize a bank lends to multiple ￿rms, equation (3) has to
be modi￿ed to include idiosyncratic demand shocks experienced by these other ￿￿j￿￿rms. The ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect
will only absorb ￿rm j￿ s demand shock and the other ￿￿j￿￿rms￿demand shocks that comove with j￿ s demand
shock. However, since these remaining components are, by construction, orthogonal to j￿ s demand shock, ￿1; is
identi￿ed. Put another way, all one requires for identi￿cation is that ￿rm j￿ s bank experiences a net (of other
￿rms￿demands) liquidity supply shock that is orthogonal to ￿rm j￿ s credit demand.
13channel can be determined by estimating the following ￿rst-di⁄erenced equation:
￿Yj = ￿F
0 + ￿F
1 ￿ ￿Dj + ￿j (6)
where ￿Dj is the average liquidity shock faced by ￿rm j￿ s pre-shock banks. If the ￿rm
borrowing channel completely insulates a ￿rm from loan speci￿c bank lending channels, then
liquidity shocks to a ￿rm￿ s banks should have no net impact on the ￿rm￿ s borrowing, i.e. ￿F
1
should be zero.
Equation (6) has the same identi￿cation concerns as equation (4), namely that ￿Dj might
be positively correlated with ￿j. However, unlike before, we can no longer put in ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects since (6) is aggregated to the ￿rm level. We therefore adopt a di⁄erent strategy based on
the nature of nuclear test induced liquidity shocks to estimate ￿F
1 : Suppose we could prove that
the circumstances generating the liquidity shocks (￿Dj) actually led to a negative correlation
between ￿Dj and unobserved demand shocks (￿j). Then even an OLS estimate of ￿F
1 in
equation (6) is useful as it gives us an underestimate of the true e⁄ect.
How are bank liquidity and loan demand shocks correlated in the cross-section?
Liquidity supply and demand shocks are likely to be positively correlated in the time-series
in general for reasons mentioned earlier. However, it is less clear whether these shocks are
positively correlated cross-sectionally i.e. across lenders at a given point in time. In our case
we in fact demonstrate that the nuclear tests induced liquidity demand and supply shocks are
negatively correlated in the cross-section. We ￿rst show evidence in favor of this claim and then
provide an empirical test to check whether the correlation is indeed negative in data.
Figure II shows that banks with greater proportion of dollar deposits experienced larger
declines in liquidity. Columns (1) and (2) of Table II con￿rm the statistical signi￿cance of
this relationship both in terms of t-stats as well as R-sq. Column (2), which weighs each
observation by bank size and is thus economically more meaningful, shows that a 1% increase
in the percentage of dollar deposits held by a bank prior to nuclear tests leads to a 0.30% decline
in bank liquidity. The R-sq is also high at 40%. Columns (3) through (6) show that although
the dollar reliant banks su⁄ered larger liquidity declines, they were initially lending to better
quality ￿rms. This is re￿ ected by the fact that more dollar reliant banks had signi￿cantly lower
default rates, and signi￿cantly higher pro￿tability. Similar results are obtained if we replace
percentage dollar deposits with actual deposit change on the RHS i.e. banks that experienced
14larger declines in deposits were initially more pro￿table and had lower defaults.10
If more pro￿table ￿rms are better able to adapt to adverse macro shocks induced by the
nuclear tests, then our assertion that ￿Dj and ￿j are negatively correlated is valid. While the
evidence in Table II is suggestive, we can also o⁄er a more direct test for the negative correlation
























1 provides a direct test of how ￿Di is correlated with ￿j: In the results
section we will show that the OLS estimate is smaller than the FE estimate in the same sample
of multiple-bank ￿rms for which we run the FE estimate. Thus Corr(￿Di;￿j) < 0 and the
OLS estimates of ￿rm-level outcomes will be under-estimates.11
We should note that the assumption we are implicitly making here is that the same selection
that applies to multiple-bank ￿rms (for which we can estimate the bank lending channel by
using ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects) also holds for single-bank ￿rms. In other words, banks with better
multiple-relationship ￿rms also have better single-relationship ￿rms. This is not only plausible,
but examining the equivalent of Columns (3)-(6) in Table II restricting to loans only to single-
relationship ￿rms shows the same pattern - banks with greater liquidity shocks do have better
single-relationship ￿rms.
III Results: Non-parametric patterns
We ￿rst describe our main ￿ndings through simple non-parametric graphs. The subsequent
regressions will show that the same patterns hold under more demanding speci￿cations. Our
non-parametric analysis is based on the 18,647 ￿rms that were borrowing at the time of the
nuclear tests and were not in default.
10One could argue here that although banks with more dollar deposits were of better quality, they might
systematically lend to those ￿rms whose liquidity demand ￿co-moves￿with the bank￿ s supply of liquidity (see
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) for the full theoretical argument). If this were true then more dollar reliant
banks would also experience larger liquidity demand shocks. While the argument is valid in general, it is unlikely
to apply in our context because of the exchange rate insurance provided by the central bank. The insurance
implied that banks did not have an incentive to try to hedge exchange rate ￿ uctuation when making lending
decisions.
11While our argument is in terms of the bank-speci￿c liquidity shock, ￿i, and a ￿rm￿ s demand shock, ￿j;
equation (6) aggregates the bank-speci￿c liquidity shocks across all of ￿rm j￿ s banks. However, it is easy to show
that Corr(￿i;￿j) < 0 _ i =) Corr(￿Di;￿j) < 0 since ￿Di is just a weighted average of the ￿i￿ s.
15Figure IIIa illustrates the bank-lending channel by separating loans to these ￿rms into loans
from ￿positive￿and ￿negative￿liquidity banks. Positive liquidity banks refer to banks that had
above median growth in deposits after the (nuclear) shock, while negative liquidity banks refer
to those with below median deposit growth. We aggregate loans within each bank category by
quarter, and plot the logarithm of aggregate lending over time. Doing so puts greater weight
on larger loans and ensures our results are economically meaningful. Log aggregate lending
is normalized to zero in the quarter of nuclear tests (1998Q2). The y-axis values can thus be
interpreted as growth rates in lending relative to the nuclear shock quarter.
The aggregate trends in ￿gure IIIa provide revealing information regarding the bank lending
channel and support for our identi￿cation strategy. First, the trend in lending before the shock
is similar between positive and negative liquidity shock banks. Consequently any divergence
in trend after the shock cannot be attributed to pre-existing di⁄erential trends. Second, there
is a sharp divergence in trends right after the nuclear tests. This divergence in lending due to
a bank￿ s liquidity shock is the ￿bank lending channel￿and it can be estimated as a double-
di⁄erence, i.e. the di⁄erence in lending between positively and negatively a⁄ected banks after
the shock less the di⁄erence between the two before the shock.
The bank lending channel in ￿gure IIIa is not driven by large ￿rms alone. We classify ￿rms
as ￿large￿if their average annual borrowing is in the top 30%, and ￿small￿otherwise.12 Figures
III b-c repeat the analysis in Figure IIIa separately for large and small ￿rms and show that the
same patterns as before hold.
Figures IVa-b next examine the ￿rm borrowing channel by asking what happens to a ￿rm￿ s
overall borrowing after the shock. Speci￿cally, we repeat the analysis of ￿gure III but this
time aggregate all loans across lenders for a given ￿rm at each point in time. A ￿rm is then
grouped into the positive liquidity shock category if its bank(s) at the time of nuclear tests
received above median liquidity shock on average (and the opposite for negative liquidity shock
category). The ￿gures show that large ￿rms are completely able to compensate the adverse
e⁄ects of the bank lending channel by borrowing more from new and existing liquid banks, but
small ￿rms are entirely unable to do so.
Figures Va and Vb then examine whether the ￿rm borrowing channel (for smaller ￿rms)
12Section V.D. diaggregates size categories by deciles, and justi￿es why we de￿ne the top three deciles as
￿large￿and the rest as ￿small￿ .
16also a⁄ects a ￿rm￿ s overall ￿nancial strength. Figures Va-b repeat the analysis of ￿gures IVa-b,
but replace the y-axis by the average default rate of ￿rms for the two categories of (positive and
negatively liquidity shock) ￿rms. The default rate is zero by construction before the nuclear
tests since we exclude ￿rms that were already in default at the time of the tests. Consistent
with the results in ￿gures IVa-b, we ￿nd that for large borrowers there is no impact of bank
liquidity shocks at the ￿rm level. If anything, ￿rms borrowing from negative liquidity banks
have a lower default rate. This supports our earlier claim that such (a⁄ected) banks had better
quality ￿rms. On the other hand within smaller ￿rms, those borrowing from negative liquidity
banks are signi￿cantly more likely to default, suggesting the lending channel identi￿ed earlier
has real consequences for small (but not large) ￿rms. The e⁄ect on default shows up a few
quarters after the shock suggesting that ￿rms are able to use internal/informal sources of credit
to survive in the short run but cannot keep this up for long.
Figures III-V illustrate our main results and show that they are persistent. The next sections
will show that these broad patterns hold up to more demanding empirical speci￿cations and a
variety of robustness tests.
IV Results: The Bank Lending Channel
Taking our empirical methodology to the data, we start with the time-collapsed loan level data
described in section I, with a single pre and one post nuclear test observation for each loan.
Alternatively, we could have estimated equation (5) in the time-series data by including ￿rm-
quarter ￿xed e⁄ects. Doing so provides similar results but, as mentioned earlier, we prefer
to collapse the time-dimension to obtain more conservative standard errors. For expositional
convenience, we divide our analysis of the bank lending channel into two parts, an ￿intensive
margin￿referring to a reduction in the amount of lending to ￿rms borrowing at the time of the
liquidity shock, and an ￿extensive margin￿referring to the denial of credit to existing borrowers
and to new borrowers.
17A. The Intensive Margin
There were 22,176 performing loans to 18,647 ￿rms at the time of the nuclear tests that contin-
ued borrowing some amount after the tests as well.13 Table III estimates the ￿rst-di⁄erenced
speci￿cation (4). We regress the change in log loan amount as a result of the nuclear tests on
the change in log bank liquidity. Since the liquidity shock occurs at the bank level, changes in
loans from the same bank may be correlated. Therefore all our loan level regressions cluster
errors at the bank level. Since there are only 42 banks in our main sample, standard errors are
likely to be conservative.
Column (1) in Table III presents the preferred FE estimation strategy in equation (5)
that provides an unbiased estimate of the bank lending channel coe¢ cient. The FE sample is
restricted to the 1,864 multi-bank ￿rms with a total of 5,382 loans. The results indicate a large
bank lending channel: A 1% decline in bank liquidity leads to 0.6% decline in the bank￿ s loan
to a ￿rm. Since the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects in column (1) are added after ￿rst di⁄erencing the data,
they absorb all time-varying ￿rm-speci￿c factors including ￿rm credit demand shocks. Columns
(2) and (3) show that this result is robust to adding bank and loan-level controls, including
loan-type interacted with ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects. We will return to these results in more detail when
we discuss robustness issues at the end of the section.
Figure VI graphically illustrates how the ￿rm FE approach addresses the concern of supply-
demand correlation by holding ￿xed the identity of a ￿rm across positive and negative liquidity
banks. This ￿gure is the graphical counterpart to the regression in column (1) and the ￿rm
￿xed e⁄ects counterpart to ￿gure IIIa. We start with the set of 1,864 ￿rms (5,382 loans) that
borrowed from multiple banks at the time of the nuclear tests. For each ￿rm, we classify
its bank as a ￿positive liquidity shock bank￿if its liquidity shock is higher than the median
liquidity shock for all banks lending to that ￿rm. The remaining banks lending to that ￿rm
are classi￿ed as ￿negative liquidity shock banks￿ . We then ￿de-mean￿ the (logarithm) loan
amount by subtracting the (logarithm of) average loan size at the ￿rm level in each quarter.
The ￿gure then plots the ￿rm￿ s demeaned loan amounts for it￿ s positive and negative liquidity
banks. Figure VI shows that on average there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between loans taken
13For the intensive margin sample we exclude ￿rms that immediately and entirely stop borrowing from their
bank(s) after the shock i.e. ￿rms that don￿ t borrow anything in every post-shock period. Such ￿rms show
up as large outlyers in our ￿rst-di⁄erence log-speci￿cation and would therefore unduly in￿ uence our estimates.
Including these ￿rms only increases the magnitude of our estimates.
18by the same ￿rm from positive and negative liquidity banks before the nuclear tests. However
once the liquidity shock hits, there is a sudden and sharp divergence in loans given out by the
two sets of banks to the same ￿rm. Since ￿rm level changes in loan demand are taken out by
construction, ￿gure VI provides a tight identi￿cation of the bank lending channel e⁄ect.
Column (4) estimates the OLS bank lending channel coe¢ cient using the same multi-bank
sample of column (1). The OLS coe¢ cient drops to 0.46, compared to 0.60 for FE. As sec-
tion II highlighted, the drop in the OLS coe¢ cient implies that a bank￿ s liquidity supply it￿ s
client ￿rms￿loan demand shocks are cross-sectionally negatively correlated. Consequently, OLS
provides an underestimate of the true e⁄ect.
Column (5) repeats the OLS speci￿cation of column (4) on the full sample of ￿rms. The
bank lending channel coe¢ cient is larger in the full sample, suggesting that the lending channel
e⁄ect is larger for single relationship ￿rms. We ￿nd in columns (6) and (7) that the lending
channel is indeed stronger for smaller ￿rms, where ￿small￿refers to ￿rms in the bottom 70%
of the size distribution.
B. The Extensive Margin
Do bank liquidity shocks also impact the extensive margin of banks by forcing them to either
stop lending to ￿rms altogether or reducing the intake of new ￿rms? We begin by testing if
the ￿exit rate￿of ￿rms is higher in banks harder hit by the liquidity crunch. For each loan, we
create a variable, EXIT; which is 1 if the loan is not renewed at some point during the ￿rst
post-nuclear test year. As before, we use the ￿rm FE approach to control for changes in loan
demand at the ￿rm level, and test whether the same ￿rm borrowing from di⁄erent banks is
more likely to exit a negative liquidity shock bank. This translates into estimating the following
FE speci￿cation on multi-bank ￿rms:
EXITij = ￿j + ￿1 ￿ ￿Di + "ij (7)
￿1 is the coe¢ cient of interest.
Column (1) in Table IV runs the FE speci￿cation and shows that a 1% reduction in bank
liquidity leads to a 21 basis points increase in the probability of exit for a loan (that is about
a 1% increase in probability since the mean exit rate for loans was 20:7% during this period).
19Column (2) shows that the result remains robust to adding pre-shock bank level controls such
as the bank￿ s return on assets, size, capitalization ratio, portfolio quality and ownership type.
Column (3) then examines whether smaller borrowers experience the same (or larger) im-
pact. Since small borrowers typically borrow from a single bank only (and would therefore be
absorbed by the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect), we prefer to run an OLS speci￿cation on the full sample of
￿rms. The results in Column (3) show there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in exit rates in response
to the liquidity shock between large and small borrowers.14
We next test if liquidity shocks also impact the ability of banks to make new loans. To do
so, we start with all loans given out in the post nuclear test year (35,921 loans) and create a
variable ENTRY , which is 1 if the loan was ￿rst made in the post nuclear tests period. Using
ENTRY as the LHS variable, we repeat the analysis presented in columns (1) through (3).
Column (4) shows that liquidity supply signi￿cantly impacts a bank￿ s ability to issue new
loans. A 1% reduction in bank liquidity reduces its probability of making a loan to a new client
by 12 basis points (the mean entry rate in the data was 38.5%). The ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects once
again ensure that the entry e⁄ect is not driven by unobserved ￿rm-level time-varying factors
(such as shocks to credit demand). Column (5) shows that the e⁄ect remains robust to bank
level controls. Columns (6) runs OLS in the full sample of ￿rms, and shows that while large
borrowers are more likely to start new relationships with positive liquidity banks, this e⁄ect is
twice as large for small borrowers i.e. not only are small borrowers more likely to enter, they
do so more (less) for banks with greater (lower) liquidity.
Tables III and IV show that bank liquidity shocks have large lending channel e⁄ects both
on the intensive and extensive margins. The magnitude of these e⁄ects is also large. Since the
standard deviation of bank liquidity shocks is 30% (Table I), a one standard deviation shock
to bank liquidity leads to an 18% decline in lending, a 6.3 percentage points increase in the
likelihood of exit, and a 3.6 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of new loan origination.
The results suggest that the MM theorem breaks down at bank level, and shocks to the banking
sector are transmitted to ￿rms through changes in the banks￿lending patterns.
14Using a non-linear probit model gives the same results as our linear speci￿cation. We prefer to use the linear
model since the results are then comparable with the Firm FEs speci￿cation where we cannot use a probit model.
20C. Do Liquidity shocks impact the price of loans?
So far we have focused on the amount of loan given out by a bank. We now test whether
in addition to this quantity e⁄ect, bank liquidity shocks also a⁄ect the price of loans i.e. the
interest rate charged. While the loan level CIB data set does not record interest rates charged,
another data source from the central bank records the average interest rate for loans of di⁄erent
sizes charged by a given bank branch at a point in time. This data can be used to proxy for
the interest rate charged on a given loan using loan size and location information.
Using this data we compute the change in interest rates from December 1997 to December
1999 for each loan and regress this variable on change in log of bank liquidity as before.15
Column (1) in table V presents our preferred ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation and shows no
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect, i.e. a ￿rm does not experience interest rate increases from its
bank that experienced a greater liquidity fall relative to one that did not. Comparing within
the same ￿rm assures us that the interest rate comparison is not a⁄ected by any ￿rm-level
di⁄erences in credit demand etc.
Column (2) pushes this further by introducing loan-type interacted with ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects
i.e. not only comparing interest rates across the same ￿rm borrowing from two banks, but
across the same ￿rm borrowing the same type of loan across two di⁄erent banks. Column
(3) presents the OLS (and potentially biased) results in the full sample of ￿rms. While the
coe¢ cient magnitude rises, so do standard errors. Column (4) examines whether the e⁄ect
varies by ￿rm size and ￿nds no signi￿cant results. So while the bank lending channel a⁄ects the
quantity of loan supply, it does not a⁄ect the average price charged by banks.
Note that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on change in liquidity is weakly positive, suggest-
ing that even if there is a price e⁄ect, it is the opposite of what one would expect: Instead of
negatively shocked banks raising their interest rates, they are more likely to drop them. This is
not surprising if the liquidity drop causes banks to cut lending to marginally riskier borrowers
that are typically charged higher interest rates. More generally, the small magnitude could
also be because interest rates are constrained due to inter-bank loan competition, or because
of a fear of increasing moral hazard concerns. We should caution that it could also simply be
that our average interest rate information is not disaggregated enough to capture di⁄erences in
interest rates at the loan-level across ￿rms. This is unlikely though, since a general examination
15Out of the 42 commercial banks used in our analysis, interest rate information is available for 39.
21of lending suggests there is not much variation in interest rates even at the loan level.
Our interest rate results are similar in spirit to Peterson and Rajan (1994) who ￿nd that
closer ties between the ￿rm and its creditor increases the availability of credit but does not
lower the price of credit. This suggests that quantity rather than price is the more relevant
margin in bank-￿rm relationships.
D. Robustness to alternative explanations
Although the ￿rm ￿xed approach we use to identify the bank-lending channel resolves a number
of empirical concerns by accounting for ￿rm speci￿c time-varying variables such as changes in
a ￿rm￿ s credit demand and in other ￿rm level attributes, we address some remaining concerns
here.
Loan-speci￿c credit demand
Firm ￿xed e⁄ects take out spurious credit demand concerns by absorbing changes in credit
demand at the ￿rm level. However, this may not be su¢ cient if a ￿rm￿ s credit demand is loan
speci￿c and shocks to loan demand are correlated with the bank liquidity shocks. For example,
suppose that dollar reliant banks specialize in making longer term loans, and nuclear tests led
to a disproportionate reduction in the demand for long term loans. Then, even in the absence of
any bank lending channel, ￿rms borrowing from dollar reliant banks will contract their relative
borrowing from these banks.
We can test for such concerns using information on the type of loan taken by a ￿rm. A loan
in our data set can be classi￿ed as: (i) short term (under 6 months) working capital loans, (ii)
longer term ￿xed loans, and (iii) non-funded loans such as guarantees and letters of credit. We
then control for loan types non-parametrically by interacting ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects with loan type
to ensure comparison of the same loan type and for the same ￿rm across banks (this gives us
2,731 ￿xed e⁄ects for the 1,864 ￿rms in the sample of ￿rms with multiple pre-shock banks). The
result in column (3) of Table III shows no signi￿cant change in the lending channel coe¢ cient.
It is also worth noting here that since most of the ￿rms belong to traditional sectors such as
textile and consumer goods, it is unlikely that ￿rms take ￿specialized￿loans in the ￿rst place.
A similar concern may be related to ￿rms taking on export related loans from dollar reliant
banks. If the export part of a ￿rm￿ s business su⁄ered disproportionately more, then once
again we will have a spurious within ￿rm correlation between credit demand and bank liquidity
22shocks. We test for this concern (regression not shown) by limiting our ￿xed e⁄ect analysis to
the 1,588 ￿rms that do not export at all and ￿nd that the bank lending coe¢ cient is unchanged
(0.55 vs. 0.60 in column (1) of Table III).
Heterogeneity in bank response to macro shocks
Could the lending channel coe¢ cient be driven by inherent di⁄erences in how banks respond
to the shocks induced by the nuclear tests? This is possible if there is such response hetero-
geneity and it is systematically correlated with a bank￿ s liquidity shock. For example, perhaps
the lending channel estimate is picking up di⁄erences in how foreign and local banks react to
nuclear tests since we know that foreign banks are more likely to deal in dollar deposits.
For example, suppose more dollar reliant banks (which we know are better banks ex-ante)
are generally more ￿cautious￿in making loans and therefore react more than other banks to a
given ￿rm productivity shock. Then dollar reliant banks, that also experience larger declines
in deposits, might cut back lending to the same ￿rm more, not because of a lack of liquidity,
but because they want to reduce their loan portfolio risk more than less a⁄ected banks.
We test for such concerns by including various bank characteristics that proxy for such
di⁄erential lending sensitivity as controls. Column (2) in Table III includes several pre nuclear-
test bank level controls such as the bank￿ s return on assets, lagged deposit growth, bank size,
capitalization ratio, fraction of portfolio in default, and dummies for foreign and government
banks.16 Bank ROA, portfolio in default and capitalization ratios in particular are likely to
capture a banks￿sensitivity to client quality. The results indicate that the lending channel
coe¢ cient remains robust to all these bank level controls.
While unlikely, one may still worry that these pre-shock measures are not appropriate be-
cause they are not good proxies for the bank￿ s quality sensitivity or even if they are initially,
they are not after the shock. We can address this remaining concern more directly by examining
changes in the quality of the bank￿ s portfolio after the shock. If the di⁄erential quality sensitiv-
ity criticism is valid then the banks facing liquidity shocks should be relatively more unwilling
to lend to ￿rms experiencing negative productivity shocks and therefore their portfolio quality
should (relatively) increase after the shock. In Table VIII we will directly examine changes in
￿rm default rate and in fact show that the opposite is true - banks with greater liquidity shocks
16Pre-98 ROA, bank size, and capitalization rate are averages over ￿scal years 1996 and 1997 (￿scal years end
in december). Pre-98 deposit growth is calculated as growth in deposits from dec 1996 to dec 1997.
23see their client ￿rms￿default rates increase. Thus it cannot be that these banks are becoming
more quality conscious than other banks.
Other robustness and interpretational concerns
A potential concern may be that the bank lending channel captures an initial di⁄erential
cost of capital di⁄erence i.e. if banks had lower costs of capital on account of holding foreign
currency accounts, then one may worry that their lending drop after the liquidity shock is not
a result of the supply shock but a price correction (i.e. the removal of the cheaper source of
capital). If this were the case then one would expect to see such banks raise the interest rates
on their loans as a result of this price correction. However, the results in Table V show the
opposite. Such negatively a⁄ected banks actually drop their interest rates although this result
is not economically or statistically signi￿cant.
One should also point out an alternate ￿deposits as collateral￿based explanation. To the
extent that a ￿rm￿ s cash balances are informative about it￿ s cash ￿ ows and o⁄er liquid collateral,
bank￿ s may reduce lending to a ￿rm simply because the ￿rm draws down its cash reserves held
as bank deposits. However, such level e⁄ects are taken into account by the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects in
our primary ￿rst-di⁄erenced speci￿cation. The ￿rm-￿xed e⁄ects strategy is called to question
only if a bank gives greater weight to a ￿rm￿ s cash reserves that are held at the bank itself as
compared to cash reserves held at others bank. This is particularly implausible for large ￿rms,
since banks have access to audited information regarding such ￿rm￿ s cash reserves and ￿ ows.
Since the bank lending channel holds for such large ￿rms as well, it seems unlikely that it is
primarily driven by such collateral based explanations.
Finally, a concern might be that our FE results represent a ￿strategic￿withdrawal by ￿rms
from hard hit banks. For example, a ￿rm may choose to cut back borrowing from a bank
facing liquidity problems and switch to more liquid banks for fear that the liquidity constrained
bank might become insolvent in the future. However, this is unlikely since banks hit by the
liquidity crunch were historically more pro￿table (as borne out in Table II) and, while they did
see pro￿tability decline post-shock, they still remained as pro￿table as the banks which did not
loose liquidity. In fact, no bank declared insolvency after the nuclear tests.
It is worth noting that the last concern is more of an interpretational issue. Provided the
loan decline is induced on account of the initial supply-side shock, i.e. ￿rms borrow less from
banks that were hit by a larger liquidity shock (that is exogenous to the ￿rms￿demand), one
24could interpret it as a bank lending channel.
V Results: Firm Level Impact
A. Can Firms Hedge Bank Speci￿c Liquidity Shocks?
We have seen that negative shocks to a bank￿ s liquidity supply translate into a (causal) drop in
its client ￿rms￿loans. However, such bank lending channels may not have any aggregate e⁄ect if
￿rms can compensate for bank-speci￿c loan losses by borrowing more from banks with greater
liquidity. Unlike earlier empirical studies, we can test for the extent of such substitution since
our data matches ￿rms to all 145 bank and non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries in the economy.
So far we restricted our attention to the 42 commercial banks that used demandable deposits
as their source of liquidity. Since a ￿rm might use any commercial or non-commercial bank
to compensate for the lending channel, we now include all the 145 ￿nancial intermediaries in
our analysis and construct the aggregate loan amount borrowed by each ￿rm from all of these
intermediaries before and after the nuclear tests.
We then compute the average liquidity shock faced by each ￿rm by constructing a loan-size
weighted average of the change in deposits for the banks that the ￿rm borrowed from before the
nuclear tests. In constructing this aggregate liquidity shock at ￿rm level, we assume that non-
commercial banks experience the economy wide change in liquidity. Since the non-commercial
banks only comprise 22% of the market share, this assumption is not crucial for our results.
For example, assuming instead that non-commercial banks experience no change in liquidity
does not change our results.
As discussed in section (II), equation (6) provides a test for the extent of substitution. If
there is no substitution then ￿F
1 in (6) should be the same as that in (4) i.e. the same as the
bank-lending channel e⁄ect. At the other extreme, if there is full substitution, all ￿rms will
have equal access to lenders regardless of whom they borrowed from initially. In such a scenario,
a given bank￿ s liquidity crunch will have no impact on its ￿rm￿ s aggregate borrowing and ￿F
1
will be zero since all ￿rms will only respond to the aggregate liquidity shock (captured by ￿F
0 ).
More generally, the greater the substitution, the closer ￿F
1 will be to zero.
Column (1) in Table VI shows that on average ￿rms are unable to compensate for the
bank-lending channel by increasing borrowing from more liquid banks. Column (2) separates
25this e⁄ect for large and smaller borrowers and shows that while large borrowers almost fully
o⁄set their bank￿ s liquidity shock, in stark contrast, the signi￿cant interaction term shows that
smaller borrowers are unable to hedge the initial liquidity shock faced by their banks. For a one
percent decline in their initial banks liquidity, total borrowing for these ￿rms drops by 0.8%,
essentially the same result as the bank lending channel for smaller ￿rms. Thus smaller borrowers
are unable to avoid the adverse liquidity shock by going to other lenders in the market.17
Figure VII presents a non-parametric picture of this size heterogeneity. We compute the
same e⁄ect separately for each ￿rm borrowing size decile - Figure VII plots the coe¢ cient
estimate for each of the size deciles. and shows how it declines for each ￿rm decile (except the
smallest decile which probably has a lot of noise). In particular, the top three deciles show
almost no e⁄ect and justify why we include them in our ￿large￿borrower category.
Column (3) shows that this result remains robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of ￿rm
and bank level controls. Firm level controls include dummies for each of the 134 cities/towns
the ￿rm is located in, 21 industry dummies, whether the ￿rm is politically connected or not,
its membership in a business conglomerate and whether it borrows from multiple banks: Bank
level controls include lagged change in bank liquidity, pre-shock bank ROA, log bank size,
bank capitalization, fraction of the bank￿ s portfolio in default and dummies for foreign and
government banks.
Column (4) adds interactions of ￿rm attributes in addition to size, such as whether the
￿rm is a member of a large conglomerate, whether it is politically connected, and had multiple
lenders at the time of nuclear tests. The coe¢ cient on (￿Log Bank Liquidity) is now positive
and signi￿cant. This suggests that the few large ￿rms that are neither part of a conglomerate
nor politically connected also cannot completely hedge their lending channel shocks i.e. being
large alone is not su¢ cient.18
We should clarify at this point that we do not know the fundamental reason why large ￿rms,
or connected ￿rms are able to substitute out of their lending channel shocks. The results of
Table VI should be seen as more descriptive, i.e. we identify the set of ￿rms that are able to
17We still cluster observations at the bank level in Table VI. However since observations across banks are
aggregated at the ￿rm level, for multiple-relationship ￿rms we use the largest lender of a ￿rm as the unit of
clustering. Similarly, for multiple relationship ￿rms, "bank controls" are constructed by value-weighing bank
data for each of the banks a ￿rm borrows from.
18Only 11.8% of lending within large ￿rms goes to ￿rms that are neither politically a¢ liated nor connected
through a business conglomerate.
26hedge their lending channel shocks. Our data does not allow us to test whether this ability
to hedge is due to some inherent productivity advantage of these ￿rms or whether these ￿rms
can exercise some ￿power￿to get favors from banks. Our earlier work on political rent seeking
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005) suggests that ￿rm connections might provide leverage in adverse
times.
How do large and connected ￿rms substitute away their lending channel shocks? The ability
to do so is not driven by ex-ante hedging, i.e. it is not the case that these ￿rms were borrowing
from one bank that received a negative shock and another that received a positive shock. This
can partially be seen from column (4) as well that shows that borrowing from multiple banks
has no independent power in explaining hedging. Another way to analyze this is to compare the
standard deviation of bank liquidity shocks with the standard deviation of these shocks within
and between ￿rms. Table I shows that the standard deviation of bank liquidity shocks is 30%.
The between ￿rm variation in bank liquidity shocks, i.e. standard deviation of the loan-weighted
liquidity shock (￿Dj) at the ￿rm level is 22.9%, and the standard deviation of liquidity shocks
within ￿rms is 19.3%. The distribution of liquidity shocks is thus very similar between banks,
between ￿rms, and within ￿rms. Hedging is therefore an active ex-post phenomena.
Table VII further explores how large ￿rms hedge their lending channel shocks by separately
examining a ￿rm￿ s overall borrowing after the shock from its existing banks and new banks.
Column (1) ￿rst looks at overall borrowing post-shock from the banks a ￿rm was already
borrowing from prior to the shock. For every percent decrease in their banks￿liquidity, large
borrowers face a 0.15% drop in their aggregate borrowing.
Column (2) then looks at aggregate borrowing changes from banks a ￿rm was not borrowing
from before the shock. These changes are measured relative to the ￿rm￿ s total borrowing before
the shock. The result shows that large borrowers also hedge by being able to borrow more from
banks they were not borrowing from before i.e. the negative coe¢ cient implies that if a large
￿rm￿ s existing banks su⁄ered an average negative liquidity shock, the ￿rm is able to borrow
more from new banks. The coe¢ cient in column (2) is not directly comparable to that in
column (1) since it measures the sensitivity of borrowing from new banks to the old banks￿
average liquidity shock. Results from Table IV (columns (4) and (5)) already show that these
new banks are more likely to be ones with a positive liquidity shock. Column (3) repeats the
same regression as in Table VI column (3) to provide an idea of how much of the hedging large
27borrowers obtain is from pre-existing banks.19
In terms of the relative magnitude of hedging from existing and new banks, the OLS estimate
for the bank lending channel for large borrowers is 0.30 % (column (6) of Table III). This suggests
that large borrowers compensate half of their loan loss by going to (relatively more) liquid pre-
existing banks and the remaining half by borrowing from (more liquid) banks with whom they
did not have a prior relationship.
B. Firm Financial Outcomes
If the lending channel shocks e⁄ect the aggregate borrowing of small but not large ￿rms, one
might expect only the former to experience any real impact of bank liquidity shocks. However,
even the average smaller borrowers may not be adversely a⁄ected if they can compensate for
the lower aggregate external borrowing by tapping into internal cash reserves or other forms of
informal ￿nancing such as trade credit and family loans. If these internal and informal means
of ￿nancing are su¢ cient, then a reduction in external ￿nancing might have little or no impact
on a ￿rm￿ s real outcomes.
While we do not have ￿rm level output data, we do observe whether a ￿rm goes into
￿nancial distress (default). We can thus test whether bank liquidity shocks also translate into
a real impact at ￿rm level. We run regression speci￿cation (6) with a ￿rm￿ s default rate as the
LHS variable. Since cross-default clauses make it unlikely a ￿rm can default on one bank but
not the other, and the data shows that this is indeed the case, default rate is aggregated at the
￿rm level.
Column (1) in Table VIII shows that ￿rms that on average experience a reduction in their
banks￿liquidity experience higher default rates. In particular, a 1% reduction in liquidity of a
bank increases the probability of default of its ￿rm by about 13:7 basis points. Given a mean
post nuclear test default rate of 6.9 percentage points, this is a 2% increase in probability.
Recall that our identi￿cation strategy suggests that the increase in default rate of ￿rms more
exposed to a liquidity crunch cannot be attributed to unobserved negative productivity shocks
experienced by such ￿rms and that, if anything, this bias leads to an underestimate. In the
19Note that that the Column (1) and (2) coe¢ cents can￿ t be simply averaged to obtain the Column (3)
coe¢ cient both because the weights are not equal - they depend on the average share of the ￿rm￿ s borrowing
from old and new banks (it is smaller for new) - and because the log-log speci￿cation used implies the coe¢ cient
is only an approximate weighted average (holds for small liquidity shocks).
28absence of a liquidity shock to their banks, these ￿rms are unlikely to have had di⁄erentially
higher default rates.
Thus not only does a liquidity crunch reduce overall lending to ￿rms, but it also makes it
more likely for the a⁄ected ￿rms to enter ￿nancial distress. This is particularly important since
it suggests that ￿rms cannot compensate their loss of formal credit through informal channels
such as drawing on internal capital or borrowing from sister/family ￿rms.
If higher default rates for ￿rms borrowing from more credit-crunched banks is due to reduced
loans to the ￿rms, we should see the same relationship between change in default rates and
change in a ￿rm￿ s loans. In general, change in loan supply is endogenous to changes in a ￿rm￿ s
demand conditions. A potential instrument for change in a ￿rm￿ s loan supply is the ￿rm￿ s
bank￿ s liquidity.20 Column (2) instruments the change in a ￿rm￿ s loans by the change in its
bank￿ s liquidity and shows an even larger e⁄ect on a ￿rm￿ s default rate of a reduction in its
loan supply.
Recall that column (2) in Table VI showed that larger borrowers experienced little/no
reduction in aggregate borrowing due to their ability to hedge the bank speci￿c shocks while
smaller borrowers were unable to do so. If default rates increase due to the credit constraints
faced by ￿rms, one would expect the impact on default rates to be higher for smaller borrowers.
This is con￿rmed in column (3). The results show that large borrowers experience no signi￿cant
increase in their default rates when borrowing from liquidity constrained banks. However, in
sharp contrast, smaller borrowers are a⁄ected adversely by the shock and are signi￿cantly more
likely to go into ￿nancial distress. A 1% decrease in their banks￿liquidity leads to about 16
basis points increase in their probability of default. Column (4) includes the full set of bank
and ￿rm level controls and results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Column (5) shows that this result is not a⁄ected if we allow for heterogeneity across other
￿rms attributes. However, having connections to a large conglomerate has independent advan-
tages of its own in terms of not su⁄ering the negative consequences of bank liquidity shocks.
Note that we cannot run IV in columns (3) and (4) because as Table VI showed, the ￿rst
stage does not hold for large borrowers. These results suggest that the liquidity shock has real
￿nancial consequences that vary starkly across large and smaller borrowers - the former remain
20The ￿rst stage for this instrument is given in Table IV. To the extent that bank￿ s experiencing greater liquidity
shocks only a⁄ect their client ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial condition through the amount lent, the exclusion restriction for the
instrument would be satis￿ed.
29protected from the shock while the latter face its full brunt.
VI Concluding Remarks
The aim of this study was to trace how supply side bank liquidity shocks get transmitted to
the rest of the economy. Our ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects approach provides a new way of isolating the
credit supply channel by absorbing any credit demand shocks at ￿rm level. Since the data used
in this paper is potentially available in many other countries as well, our methodology can be
applied more widely to understand the lending channel transmission mechanism.
While the bank lending channel identi￿ed in this paper is large regardless of the type of
borrowing ￿rm, a particular subset of ￿rms can hedge the adverse e⁄ects of lending channel
by forming new banking relationships and borrowing more from more liquid banks. Firms that
are able to do so successfully are large connected ￿rms.
Since about 90 percent of lending goes to such ￿rms that can hedge completely, one could
argue that bank liquidity shocks have no signi￿cant aggregate e⁄ects. However, given that
almost 70% percent of ￿rms (by number) cannot hedge the negative lending channel shocks
and consequently get exposed to increased likelihood of ￿nancial distress, bank liquidity shocks
have serious long term distributional implications. These distributional changes are likely to
last not only due to the persistence of the initial e⁄ect, but also as they get reinforced through
the series of liquidity shocks that hit economies. Macro shocks may therefore contribute to the
￿missing middle￿in ￿rm size distribution one often documents in emerging markets.
The inability of small unconnected ￿rms to hedge suggests that the ￿xed costs of forming
new banking relationships might be an important constraint in ￿nancial markets. Certain ￿rms
might be able to use their size or corporate and political a¢ liations to ￿buy￿their way into
preferential banking relationships. While this insurance due to size and linkages may be speci￿c
to our environment, it is likely that some form of ￿rm heterogeneity exists in other, particularly
emerging economy, environments as well. Therefore, how the corporate sector responds and
evolves in response to large ￿nancial shocks and how these corporate structures in turn in￿ uence
￿nancial market reforms both o⁄er fruitful areas of future research.
30Appendix I: Firm Attributes
Details on the ￿rm attributes used in this paper:
(i) Politically Connected. An indicator variable which is equal to 1 if one of the directors
of the ￿rm ran in a national or provincial election during the 1993 or 1997 general elections in
Pakistan.
(ii) Size. The total borrowing by a ￿rm from all the banks in the country (including foreign,
domestic, and government banks) is used as a proxy for borrower size. Top 30% of ￿rms by
size are classi￿ed as ￿large￿ , and the rest as ￿small￿ .
(iii) Location. This variable captures which type of city or town the borrower belongs to.
Cities are classi￿ed by their population size into three categories: big, medium and small.
Borrowers located in the three largest cities (city population greater than 2 million) are coded
as big, while those in cities with population between 0.5-2 and 0-0.5 million are coded as medium
and small respectively.21
(iv) Single Relationship. This variable captures whether the ￿rm had single or multiple
banking relationships at the time of nuclear tests in May 1998.
(v) Conglomerate. Using information on the names and tax identi￿cation numbers of all
directors of a ￿rm we can classify ￿rms into business networks based on their ownership informa-
tion. Firms are assigned to the same network if they have a director in common, i.e. interlocked
boards. Forming groups in this way creates two distinct category of ￿rms: (a) Conglomerate
Firms ￿ these are ￿rms which belong to the large conglomerates, de￿ned as networks consisting
of more than 100 ￿rms each. (b) Non-conglomerate ￿rms ￿ these are remaining ￿rms of whom
the vast majority are in networks of 5 or fewer ￿rms.
21Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi/Islamabad are coded as ￿big￿ , Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Multan, Sialkot,
Sargodha, Peshawar, Quetta, and Hyderabad are coded as ￿medium￿ , and the remaining cities and towns are
coded as ￿small￿ .
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33Variable Mean S.D.
Pre-nuclear Test Total Lending ('000) 16,479 60,768
Change in Log Lending -0.0028 1.23
Post-nuclear Test Default Rate  6.8% 26.1%






Percent of total lending 32.5% 56.1% 4.2% 7.2%
Politically Connected No Yes
Percent of total lending (of total firms) 54% (76%) 46% (24%)
Size Small Large
Percent of total lending (of total firms) 6.4% (70%) 94% (30%)
Location (City Size) Small Medium Large Unclassified
Percent of total lending (of total firms) 6% (14%) 13% (18%) 80% (62%) 6% (2%)
Single Relationship Yes No




Percent of total lending (of total firms) 36% (85%) 64% (15%)
Variable Mean S.D.
Bank Assets Dec '97 33886.3 63884.7
Average ROA ('96 & '97) 0.013 0.027
Capitalization Rate ('96 & '97) 0.082 0.054
Percentage of Dollar Deposits (Dec '97) 0.60 0.27
Average Default Rate ('96 & '97) 0.086 0.13
Growth in Deposits (Dec '97 to Dec '99) 0.046 0.30
Bank Type Private Foreign Government
Percent of total lending 33.8% 36.8% 29.4%
A "loan" is defined as a Bank-Firm pair, i.e. multiple loans of a firm from the same bank are aggregated up. The loan level data comprises 
all performing loans given out by the forty two commercial banks at the time of nuclear test that continued to be serviced. The pre and post 
data is averaged over June 1996 to March 1998, and June 1998 to March 2000 respectively. Note that since we only include performing pre-
nuclear loans, default rate just prior to nuclear tests is zero by construction. Loan Interest Rate in Panel A is available for 39 banks only. 
Politically Connected = dummy for whether firm has a politician on its board; Size = The total borrowing by a firm from all the banks; 
Small = bottom 70%; Location = captures type of city/town borrower belongs to: Big (>2 million), Medium (0.5-2 million) and small (<0.5 
million). In regressions however, each city/town is included as a separate dummy variable. Single Relationship = firm only borrows from 
one bank; Group Size = classify firms into "groups" based on interlocked board membership; see Mian and Khwaja [2005]; 
Congolomerates fims are those that belong to a large network (more than 100 firms). 
TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Panel B: Borrower/Firm Attributes (18,647 firms)
Panel C : Bank Level Variables (42 banks)
Panel A : Loan-level  Variables (22,176 loans)Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.17 -0.30 -0.27 -0.31 0.044 0.061
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.014) (0.016)
Constant 0.12 0.17 0.25 0.28 -0.013 -0.022
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.009) (0.009)
Bank-Size Weighted No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.09 0.4 0.33 0.38 0.2 0.26
The regressions examine how dollar-deposit reliant banks were affected by the liquidity shock - Columns (1) and (2) - and how they differed 
before - Columns (3)-(6). The sample is the forty two commercial banks that were allowed to open dollar deposits and hence were directly affected 
by the "dollar freeze" as a result of the nuclear tests in May 1998. Average Pre-nuclear test default rate is the loan-size weighted default rate of 
loans from a given bank over July 1996 to March 1998. The bank level default rate is defined here as a fraction between 0 and 1. Average pre-
nuclear-test ROA is the average ROA of a bank over fiscal years 1996 and 1997 (years end in December). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Percentage of Deposits in 
Dollars in Dec '97
Average Pre-Nuclear Test 
Bank ROA
TABLE II
BANK LEVEL CORRELATIONS WITH PRE-TEST DOLLAR DEPOSIT EXPOSURE
Average Pre-Nuclear Test 
Default Rate
Average Annual Growth in 
Bank Deposits (Dec '99 - 
Dec '97)Dependent Variable
FE FE FE OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.60 0.63 0.64 0.46 0.64 0.30 0.33
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15)
0.57 0.40
(0.26) (0.21)




















Constant -- -- -- -0.06 -0.04 -0.14 --
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
No of Obs 5,382 5,382 5,382 5,382 22,176 22,176 22,176
R-sq 0.44 0.44 0.6 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
the firm is located in, 21 industry dummies, whether the firm is politically connected or not, its membership in a business 
conglomerate and whether it borrows from multiple banks. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level (42 banks 
in total). 





Lag  ∆ Log Bank 
Liquidity
Pre-Shock Avg Bank 
ROA
Foreign Bank Dummy
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity
Gov. Bank Dummy
THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL - INTENSIVE MARGIN
TABLE III
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity 
* Small Firms
These regressions examine the bank-lending channel for the set of firms borrowing at the time of the shock (the intensive margin) 
in more detail. All quarterly data for a given loan is collapsed to a single pre and post nuclear test period. The nuclear test occurred 
in the 2nd Quarter of 1998, so all observations from Quarter 3 1996 to Quarter 1 1998 for a given loan are time-averaged into one. 
Similarly, all observations from 3rd Quarter 1998 to 1st Quarter 2000 are time-averaged into one. Data is restricted to: (i) banks that 
take retail (commercial) deposits (78% of all formal formal financing), and (ii) loans that were not in default in the first quarter of 
1998 (i.e. just before the nuclear tests). Columns (1)-(4) are run on the sample of firms that borrow from multiple banks (pre-shock) 
and include firm fixed effects (firm interacted with loan type for Column 4). Columns (5)-(7) also include firms borrowing from 
single banks and run an OLS specification. Firm controls in column (7) include include dummies for each of the 134 cities/townsDependent Variable
FE FE OLS FE FE OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity -0.21 -0.19 -0.16 0.12 0.15 0.087





Constant -- -- -- -- -- --
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
No of Obs 6,517 6,517 26,730 8,516 8,516 35,921
R-sq 0.48 0.49 0.09 0.54 0.55 0.21
These regressions examine how the bank-lending channel affected exit and entry of firms (from borrowing). Data is restricted to: (i) banks that take retail 
(commercial) deposits (78% of all formal formal financing), and (ii) loans that were not in default in the first quarter of 1998 (i.e. just before the nuclear tests). 
Columns (1)-(3) look at exit by including all loans that were outstanding at the time of the nuclear tests. For a given loan, "exit" is classified as 1 if the loan is not 
renewed and the firm exits its banking relationship by the first post-shock year. Columns (1)-(2) further limit the sample to only firms that were borrowing from 
multiple banks before the shock and include firms fixed effects. Columns (4)-(6) look an entry and include all loans given out after the nuclear tests quarter. For a 
given loan, "entry" is classified as 1 if the loan was made for the first time in the post-shock year. Columns (4)-(5) further limit the sample to only firms that were 
borrowing from multiple banks after the shock and include firms fixed effects.
All regressions include bank level controls: lagged change in bank liquidity, pre-shock bank ROA, log bank size, bank capitalization, fraction of portfolio in 
default and dummies for foreign and government banks. The OLS regressions also include an extensive set of firm level controls that include dummies for each 
of the 134 cities/towns the firm is located in, 21 industry dummies, whether the firm is politically connected or not, its membership in a business conglomerate 
and whether it borrows from multiple banks. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level (42 banks in total).
TABLE IV
THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL - EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Exit? Entry?
Small *  ∆ Log Bank LiquidityDependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE OLS OLS
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity 0.28 0.33 1.53 -0.43










Constant -- -- -1.59
(0.34)
No of Obs 5,161 5,161 21,769 21,769
R-sq 0.43 0.57 0.02 0.13
Columns(1)-(2) further restrict the data to firms that were borrowing from multiple banks pre-shock (in order to include firms fixed effects). Column (4) 
includes additional bank and firm level controls. The bank controls are the lagged change in bank liquidity, pre-shock bank ROA, log bank size, bank 
capitalization, fraction of portfolio in default and dummies for foreign and government banks. Additional firm level controls are dummies for each of the 
134 cities/towns the firm is located in, and 21 industry dummies. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level (42 banks in total).
 ∆ Interest Rate
These regressions examine the impact of the liquidity shock on interest rates. The interest rate data is not available for each loan but at the bank branch 
level for different loan size classifications. Using a borrower's bank branch and loan size information we can then create a "proxy" loan-level interest rate. 
All quarterly data for a given loan is then collapsed to a single pre and post nuclear test period. The nuclear test occurred in the 2nd Quarter of 1998, so all 
observations from Quarter 3 1996 to Quarter 1 1998 for a given loan are time-averaged into one. Similarly, all observations from 3rd Quarter 1998 to 1st 
Quarter 2000 are time-averaged into one. Data is restricted to: (i) banks that take retail (commercial) deposits (78% of all formal  financing), and (ii) loans 
that were not in default in the first quarter of 1998 (i.e. just before the nuclear tests). 
TABLE V
LIQUIDITY IMPACT ON INTEREST RATES
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * Small FirmsDependent Variable
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity 0.65 0.04 0.00 0.29
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
















Bank Controls Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Constant 0.04 -0.08 --
(0.01) (0.02)
No of Obs 18,647 18,647 18,647 18,647
R-sq 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06
Bank level controls include lagged change in bank liquidity, pre-shock bank ROA, log bank size, bank capitalization, fraction of 
portfolio in default and dummies for foreign and government banks. Firm level controls include dummies for each of the 134 
cities/towns the firm is located in, and 21 industry dummies. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level, i.e. the 
largest lender for a firm.
TABLE VI
THE FIRM BORROWING CHANNEL
These regressions examine the impact of the liquidity shock on the total borrowing (across all lending institutions) on firms. All 
bank loans at a point in time (from any of the 145 lending institutions) for a given firm are summed to compute the aggregate firm 
level loan size. The liquidity shock experienced by a firm is the (loan-size) weighted liquidity shock experienced by the banks it was 
borrowing from prior to the shock (lending institutions that do not hold deposits are assigned a liquidity shock of 0). All quarterly 
data for a given firm is then collapsed to a single pre and post nuclear test period. The nuclear test occurred in the 2nd Quarter of 
1998, so all observations from Quarter 3 1996 to Quarter 1 1998 for a given loan are time-averaged into one. Similarly, all 
observations from 3rd Quarter 1998 to 1st Quarter 2000 are time-averaged into one. Data is restricted to loans that were not in 
default in the first quarter of 1998 (i.e. just before the nuclear tests).  
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * Multiple 
Relationship Firms
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * Political Firm
∆ Log Aggregate Loan Size
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * Small Firms
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * Conglomerate 
FirmDependent Variable
Existing Banks New Banks Existing and New
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity 0.15 -0.40 0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)




Constant -0.19 -2.55 -0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No of Obs 18,647 18,647 18,647
R-sq 0.03 0.01 0.03
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * Small Firms
∆ Log Aggregate Loan Size
The bank controls are lagged change in bank liquidity, pre-shock bank ROA, log bank size, bank capitalization, fraction of portfolio 
in default and dummies for foreign and government banks. Firm level controls include dummies for each of the 134 cities/towns 
the firm is located in, 21 industry dummies, whether the firm is politically connected or not, its membership in a business 
conglomerate and whether it borrows from multiple banks. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level, i.e. the 
largest lender for a firm
TABLE VII
DECOMPOSING THE FIRM BORROWING CHANNEL
These regressions explore how firms compensate for their banks liquidity shock. We split a firm's total borrowing post-shock 
between banks  it was borrowing from before the shock (column 1) and banks it started borrowing from after the shock (column 2). 
The liquidity shock experienced by a firm is the (loan-size) weighted liquidity shock experienced by the banks it was borrowing from 
prior to the shock (lending institutions that do not hold deposits are assigned a liquidity shock of 0). All quarterly data for a given 
firm is collapsed to a single pre and post nuclear test period. The nuclear test occurred in the 2nd Quarter of 1998, so all 
observations from Quarter 3 1996 to Quarter 1 1998 for a given loan are time-averaged into one. Similarly, all observations from 3rd 
Quarter 1998 to 1st Quarter 2000 are time-averaged into one. Data is restricted to loans that were not in default in the first quarter 
of 1998 (i.e. just before the nuclear tests). Standard Errors in parantheses are clustered at the bank level, i.e. the largest lender for a 
firm.
Aggregating Loans Post Test Using OnlyDependent Variable
OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity -13.71 2.01 -2.36 -4.84
(7.44) (3.46) (3.07) (3.80)
 ∆ Log Firm Loan -45.46
(12.45)
















Bank Controls Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Constant 8.30 5.14 5.41 -- --
(1.35) (0.75) (0.77)
No of Obs 18,647 18,647 18,647 18,647 18,647
R-sq 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05
Bank level controls include lagged change in bank liquidity, pre-shock bank ROA, log bank size, bank capitalization, 
fraction of portfolio in default and dummies for foreign and government banks. Firm level controls include dummies for 
each of the 134 cities/towns the firm is located in, 21 industry dummies, whether the firm is politically connected or 
not, its membership in a business conglomerate and whether it borrows from multiple banks. Standard Errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the bank level, i.e. the largest lender for a firm.
TABLE VIII
FIRM BORROWING CHANNEL IMPACT ON FIRM FINANCIAL DISTRESS
These regressions examine the impact of the liquidity shock on the firm's average default rate. All bank loans at a point 
in time (from any of the 145 lending institutions) for a given firm are aggregated at the firm level to compute firm 
default rate, loan size etc. The liquidity shock experienced by a firm is the (loan-size) weighted liquidity shock 
experienced by the banks it was borrowing from prior to the shock (lending institutions that do not hold deposits are 
assigned a liquidity shock of 0). All quarterly data for a given firm is then collapsed to a single pre and post nuclear test 
period. The nuclear test occurred in the 2nd Quarter of 1998, so all observations from Quarter 3 1996 to Quarter 1 
1998 for a given loan are time-averaged into one. Similarly, all observations from 3rd Quarter 1998 to 1st Quarter 2000 
are time-averaged into one. Data is restricted to loans that were not in default in the first quarter of 1998 (i.e. just before 
the nuclear tests).
∆ Firm Default Rate
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * 
Small Firms
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * 
Conglomerate Firm
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * 
Political Firm
 ∆ Log Bank Liquidity * 
Multiple Relationship Firms
Multiple Relationship FirmsFigure I examines the prevalence of foreign currency deposit accounts in Pakistan. As the Figure shows these 
accounts, introduced in the early 90s, grew steadily till March 1998, the date of the nuclear shock (indicated by the 
red line), and then fell rapidly after that.   
Figure II illustrates the relationship between the change in liquidity/deposit base after the nuclear shock and the 
percentage of a banks deposits held in foreign currency accounts. Each observation is one of the forty two 
commercial banks in Pakistan that issued demandable deposits in both local and foreign currency. The y-axis is 
the annual change in liquidity for these banks from December '97 to December '99 and the x-axis is their pre-
nuclear test reliance on dollar deposits. Each observation is plotted proportional to its bank size in December 
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Figure II : Annual deposit growth in deposits against initial dollar deposits exposure (weighted)Figure IIIa illustrates the bank-lending channel by comparing lending to firms borrowing from two types of banks: 
Negative and positive liquidity (shock) banks, with the former defined as banks whose deposit growth was below the 
median deposit growth in the economy and the latter, banks whose deposit growth was above the median. The figure 
only includes firms that were borrowing and not in default at the time of the nuclear shock. For each quarter we 
aggregate all the loans to these firms for the positive and negative liquidity banks and plot the time series for this 
aggregate lending. To ease comparability we normalize the y-axis so that the logarithm of lending for both positive 
and negative liquidity banks is forced to be 0 at the time of the shock i.e. the time series illustrates the log-ratio of 
total loans in a given quarter relative to the quarter of the liquidity shock. The y-axis values can then be readily 



































Negative Liquidity Shock Positive Liquidity Shock
Figure IIIa: Bank Lending ChannelFigures IIIb-c illustrates the bank-lending channel separately for Large (top 30% by total borrowing) and small 
(bottom 70%) borrowers. We compare lending to large/small firms borrowing from Negative and positive liquidity 
(shock) banks. The former are defined as banks whose deposit growth was below the median deposit growth in the 
economy and the latter, banks whose deposit growth was above the median. The figure only includes firms that were 
borrowing and not in default at the time of the nuclear shock. For each quarter we aggregate all the loans to these 
firms for the positive and negative liquidity banks and plot the time series for this aggregate lending. To ease 
comparability we normalize the y-axis so that the logarithm of lending for both positive and negative liquidity banks is 
forced to be 0 at the time of the shock i.e. the time series illustrates the log-ratio of total loans in a given quarter 
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Figure IIIc: Bank Lending Channel - Small Firm LoansFigures IVa-b illustrate the impact of bank-liquidity shocks on the overall amount a firm is able to borrow. The two 
figures separately consider large (top 30% by total borrowing) and small (bottom 70%) borrowers. For each quarter, 
we compare aggregate borrowing of large/small firms by grouping firms into two types: Those that were borrowing 
from negative or positive liquidity (shock) banks at the time of the nuclear shock. The former are defined as banks 
whose deposit growth was below the median deposit growth in the economy and the latter, banks whose deposit 
growth was above the median. The figure only includes firms that were borrowing and not in default at the time of 
the nuclear shock. For each quarter we aggregate the total amount borrowed by these firms (from all 145 lending 
institutions). To ease comparability we normalize the y-axis so that the logarithm of total borrowing for both firms 
initially borrowing from positive and negative liquidity banks is forced to be 0 at the time of the shock i.e. the time 
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Figure IV b: Firm Borrowing Channel (Small Firms)Figures Va-b illustrate the impact of bank-liquidity shocks on firm default rates. The two figures separately consider large (top 
30% by total borrowing) and small (bottom 70%) borrowers. For each quarter, we compare average default rates of large/small 
firms across all their loans (weighted by its loan size) by grouping firms into two types: Those that were borrowing from negative 
or positive liquidity (shock) banks at the time of the nuclear shock. The former are defined as banks whose deposit growth was 
below the median deposit growth in the economy and the latter, banks whose deposit growth was above the median. The figure 
only includes firms that were borrowing and not in default at the time of the nuclear shock. Hence pre-default the default rate 
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Figure V b: Default Rate (Small Firms)Figure VI illustrates the bank-lending channel by comparing lending WITHIN the same firms that borrow from two 
types of banks: (relative to the firm's mean bank) Negative and positive liquidity (shock) banks. This figure is the 
counter-part of the fixed effects regression in Column (1) of Table III. Specifically, we restrict to firms that were 
borrowing (and not in default) from at least two banks before the shock. For each firm we classify its loans into those 
from banks that had a change in liquidity greater (positive) or less (negative) than this firm's average bank. We then 
demean each of the firm's loans (by subtracting the firm's average loan in each quarter). The figure then aggregates all 
the demeaned negative bank and positive bank loans and plots is logartithm on the y-axis. Given our classification 
process we are gauranteed that the same firm shows up in both the plotted lines and that one line is the negative 
mirror image of the other. Given this demeaning, if the bank-lending channel were correctly identified, we would 
expect to find little/no lending difference between the two series before the shock, but a divergence afterwards. The fig
Figure VII illustrates heterogeneity in the impact of bank liquidity shocks on overall firm borrowing for each 
borrower size decile. It does so by estimating the coefficient from an OLS specification similar to Column (3) of 
Table VI but where we separately estimate the impact of the liquidity shock on all ten borrower deciles (by pre-shock 
borrowing size). Apart from the lowest borrower decile (where we have little precision), we see that the impact on 
overall borrowing for the firm falls for larger borrowers. In fact it is almost non-existent for the largest three 
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Figure VII: Firm Borrowing Channel Coefficient by Size Decile